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By Stewart Macaulay.t New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966. Pp. xix, 224.

LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER.

The effects and the import of industrial concentration have generated voluminous commentary. Most of the studies deal with the
problem in an antitrust setting or in terms of the structural alterations that might occur and their resultant impact on the national
economy. Poised precisely in the center of a universal concern with
industrial aggrandizement is the automobile industry. It carries all
the bench marks that invite legislative and judicial scrutiny-oligopolistic market composition, immense material resources, a history
of expansion, and the possession of brute market power. Professor
Macaulay addresses his study to the tensions exuded by the latter
force. More specifically, he focuses on the unique and frequently
turbulent relationship between automobile manufacturer and franchised dealer.
The public views the dealer as an integral part in the manufacturer's distribution system. To the consumer, producer and dealer
visually and tactiley merge into the symmetry and design of the
automobile.1 The manufacturer views the relationship quite differently. To him the dealer represents nothing more than a sales instrumentality who bears no burden of risk and who should therefore
be happy to have the opportunity to market a heavily advertised presold item. On the other hand, the dealer feels that he is exploited
in that he must bear the risks of investment without counterbalancing
rights of control over his destiny. Professor Macaulay's book is a
successful endeavor, via a five stage analysis, to give some coherence
to this labyrinth of cross-pressures and embranglements.
Dealers initially endeavored to meet manufacturers' bargaining
power with private legal action-usually based upon breach of contract. A lack of express mutuality of obligation and a general refusal
by the courts to inject into the contract any implied obligations, such
as a promise by manufacturers to use their substantial powers in
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
IFor another perspective of the auto industry see R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY
(1965).
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"good faith," deprived dealers of any chance of success in private
litigation. In addition, the disparity in bargaining power allowed
the manufacturers to continue to insist upon "termination at will"
agreements. The dealers next resorted to collective private action,
utilizing with little success the association technique. The third
stage in the conflict encompasses the use of existing legislation and
various efforts by dealer representatives to have state and federal
curative laws enacted.
Macaulay only summarily discusses the use of federal statutes
predating the Dealer's Day in Court Act. 2 The space that he devotes
to this form of action focuses primarily on the codes of fair competition that were developed under the depression-inspired National
Industrial Recovery Act. Unfortunately, he swiftly glosses over
dealer utilization of trade regulation statutes. Admittedly the
dealers were generally unsuccessful, but the ratiocination and tone
from several of the decisions serves to provide valuable insights into
the texture of the relationship.
The favorite and most logical basis for attack is for the dealer
to allege the existence of a tie-in. For example, where a Chevrolet
Motor Company contract specified that the dealer sell and use for
repair only General Motors parts, it was argued that Chevrolet parts
were "tied" to Chevrolet cars and to the franchise.3 If the dealer
wanted the automobiles, he was obligated to purchase replacement
and repair parts. In acknowledging the presence of a tying arrangement, but nevertheless denying relief, the Seventh Circuit invoked
the anomolous view of the automotive distribution process that prevails among the general public in justifying the imposition of additional burdens on the dealer: "In the minds of the owners, the cars are
identified and associated with the manufacturer."4 According to this
theory, therefore, since the manufacturer bears the risk of goodwill
loss, he should have the right to dictate the use of repair and replacement parts.
The irony of the situation is that the dealers have been forced to
financially support advertising funds whose acknowledged purpose
is to create and perpetuate the manufacturer identity image. Lincoln,15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
8 Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam,
299 U.S. 3 (1936) (action brought by a General Motors competitor).
Id.

at 643.
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Mercury Dealers Advertising Funds (LMDA's), established by Ford
Motor Company, were designed to coordinate local advertising efforts
in order to achieve uniform and economical coverage. Membership
was compulsory. To finance the project Ford assessed each new car,
turning the funds over to the local LMDA's. 5 All advertising was
handled by Kenyon and Eckhardt, an agency who also did LincolnMercury institutional advertising. A North Carolina dealer attacked
the plan on two grounds: first, in his view, the dealers were forced
to buy advertising programs as a means of assuring the continuance
of the franchise; and secondly, he contended that Ford conspired to
restrain trade in the sales of cars and advertising. The district court
dismissed the tying arrangement allegation on the highly questionable reasoning that "All of the tying cases.., involve efforts by
a defendant to tie one of his own products to the sale of another of
his products-never to the sale of somebody else's product . .

.-

The Fourth Circuit predicated its refusal to overturn the trial court's
denial of restraint of trade primarily on the grounds that "only those
arrangements which unduly or unreasonably restrain commerce are
forbidden."7 The higher cost of autos resulting from advertising
was considered to be de minimus.
The dealers lack of success in obtaining relief through the trade
regulation statutory complex is surprising in view of the contemporary liberality of interpretation in that area. In post World War II
antitrust decisions, tying arrangements that involved fields other
than the auto industry have received curt and preemptory treatment.
Perhaps the unique quality of the dealer-manufacturer relationship
accounts for the difference in judicial treatment: It could be argued

5General

Motors, as a result of Justice Department pressure, no longer requires compulsory dealer contribution to national advertising. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4,
1956, at 2, col. 2.
6 Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 149 F. Supp. 790, 806 (M.D.N.C. 1957),
aff'd, 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). For a criticism of the "single vendor" definition of
the tying arrangement see Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New
Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88.
7 Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 446 (4th Cir. 1958) (emphasis in original). The Fourth Circuit concluded that a lack of these elements distinguished the present case from United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941), where the Justice Department was successful
in sustaining charges that General Motors "made use of their monopoly over the supply
of General Motors cars and their power over the economic fate of General Motors
dealers, to force GMAC on dealer-purchasers and retail purchasers of General Motors
cars, in effect tying the GMAC finance conditions and restrictions to the wholesale
purchase and retail sale of General Motors cars." Id. at 402.
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that any time the goodwill or national image of the auto manufacturer is jeopardized, there appears a sublimal presumption in favor
of the manufacturer's activities. And undoubtedly the passage of the
Dealer's Day in Court Act 8 has diluted much of the thrust of trade
regulation implementation. One court used a congressional finding
that the "antitrust laws [do] not afford automobile dealers a remedy
against inequitable and oppressive use of the manufacturers' superior
economic power ... ."". as subsidiary support in denying a dealer
antitrust recovery. It might be noted that thus far the Government
has enjoyed something less than total success in defining and containing the functional boundaries of the franchise technique. It is
a problem that will undoubtedly draw continuing court attention.
The most significant result of dealer lobbying, and the focus of
Macaulay's study, was the enactment of the Automobile Dealer
Franchise Act of 1956.10 . The result of intense and bitter dealermanufacturer skirmishing in and out of congressional hearings, all
of which Macaulay succinctly describes in detail, the Act provides
for the recovery of damages when the manufacturer fails to "act in
good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or
provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not renewing the franchise....,11
According to Professor Macaulay, the Act produced dual response
activity, one formal and the other informal. The latter response,
considered by the author to be the fourth stage of the dealer-manufacturer struggle, was manifested by manufacturers creating additional due process safeguards upon which dealers could rely in cancellation cases, expanding avenues of communication, and in a
general over-hauling and revising of the franchise agreements. These
concessions were significantly greater than the benefits achieved in
formal confrontation with manufacturers under the federal Dealer's
Day in Court Act,'2 which Macaulay discusses, along with the effects
of local legislation, in the "Fifth Stage."
The main obstacle to the successful implementation of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act is that dealers have thus far been unable
to obtain a favorable court interpretation of "good faith." Macaulay
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
' Nelligan v. Ford Motor Co., 262 F.2d 556, 559 (4th Cir. 1959).
1o

15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).

-1 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
12

15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
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concludes that "It now appears almost certain that the Good Faith
Act will be construed to give a dealer a remedy only where he can
prove coercion."1 3 In addition, the courts have approved many of
the more significant provisions in the franchise agreement and consequently have diluted much of the thrust of a contract of adhesion
14
argument.
Macaulay's analysis of federal and state legislation (the latter
probe focusing primarily on the Wisconsin treatment) is thorough
and scholarly enough to influence future judicial decision making.
However, the essence of the book is its endeavor to relate the pressures and methodology of private action groups and informal procedures to the strictures of legislative and judicial formality. The
ultimate effect of the Good Faith Act and state laws has been to
create a viable and functionable private review system. Macaulay
presents a lucid portrait of this process and its impact upon the
consumer-dealer-manufacturer. Yet, assuming the interplay of these
tensions, the question nevertheless remains-what is the nature of
the dealer-manufacturer relationship?
The impact and compulsion of externals precludes contouring
the relationship into one of the recognized legal definitional niches.
The nature of the product-second only to the home as a financial
investment-the brute size of the industry, and saturation advertising
have all operated to efface the role of the dealer. The fact that in the
final analysis the ultimate risk of sales loss falls on the manufacturer
has undoubtedly had its influence. It is therefore quite possible
that a new legal relationship is in the process of crystallization.
And although the new field will draw substantial lifeblood from areas
such as antitrust, agency, and from legislation such as the Good Faith
Act, the main sense of direction will still come from contract law.
It is difficult to determine whether Macaulay agrees with the
above conclusions. On one hand he acknowledges that his study
reveals "the long process by which legislatures removed automobile
manufacturer-dealer relations from the domain of general contract
law and created a new area of law."' 5 It would appear that Professor
Friedman's residual theory of contracts, whereby the field of contract

1"S. MAcAuLAY,

LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 106 (1966).
14 The contract of adhesion argument could be raised under the "unconscionable"
contract provision of § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
15 S. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 197.
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is inexorably being reduced through the creation of new areas,1" has
been embraced by Macaulay. If so, it is a very tentative and weak
embrace, for he observes that though "contract law itself may have
lost much of its subject matter... many of its ideas continue to be
significant in what may be called the 'newly developing nations' of
17
the law."'
By way of explanation it should be noted that the residual theory
is used to explain the contemporary concern of the courts with the
relative equities of the contracting parties. An emerging economic
environment demanded that contract principles be applied on a consistent and predictable basis. Abstraction, so it is argued, dominated
contract resolution. However, as the economy matured and as portions of contract law were legislatively and judicially segregated into
fields of specialization, e.g., sales, antitrust, insurance, courts were
relieved of the burden of maintaining predictability and could therefore shape a result to coincide with the individual needs of the
litigants.
As mentioned, Macaulay's findings neither refute nor support the
residual theory. He admits that a certain amount of contract preemption has occurred through legislation, but at the same time he
notes that "some of the traditional ideas upon which old-fashioned
classroom contract law is based reemerge to govern these new statutes
and their application.... ."is
This inconclusiveness prompts a small seed of suspicion as to the
validity of the residual theory. If Professor Friedman's study did not
demonstrate otherwise (which it does as far as Wisconsin is concerned), one might wonder whether contract commentators have not
fallen into the error of assuming the existence of a "pure" or "perfect" theory of contracts. Perhaps contract scholars are relating to
a model, existing in the never-never land of abstraction, which is held
out as perfection much in the same fashion as the debunked theory
of pure competition. 19 In other words, has contract law actually lost
16"The law of contract, then, is residuary; it applies to those agreements that are
not subject, in whole or in part, to special legal treatment, by virtue of some special
L. FRIEDMAN, CONTJaLr LAw IN AMERICA 17 (1965).
statute or legal rule....
1? S. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 199.
28 S.MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 4.
19 Professor Friedman makes this analogy: "The law of contract is,therefore, roughly
coextensive with the free market. Liberal nineteenth-century economics fits in neatly
with the law of contracts so viewed. It, too, had the abstracting habit." L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 16, at 20-21. However, Friedman adds a disclaimer: "In fact, there was
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its vitality in the realities of day-to-day commercial transactions?
One might say, and without further study it would be nothing more
than merely a comment, that with the branching off and development
of new areas such as the one discussed by Professor Macaulay, the
perimeter of contract law is actually expanding.
ARTHUR
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never any point at which the law of contracts corresponded exactly with such an
economic theory." Id. at 21.
* B.S. 1958 University of Virginia; LL.B. 1968 Tulane University; Assistant Professor
of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.

